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FALL CYBERWAR SYMPOSIUM PANEL 1: 
WHEN IS A VIRUS A WAR CRIME - TARGETABILITY 
AND COLLATERAL DAMAGE UNDER THE LAW OF 
ARMED CONFLICT
BEKA FEATHERS (American University International Law Review Symposium Editor): It is my 
pleasure to introduce our introductory remarks by Professor Kenneth Anderson. As you all know, 
he is a professor of  law here at the Washington College of  Law. He writes extensively for Law Fair 
on various issues in international law and national security and is also on the advisory board for the 
National Security Law Brief. We’re very happy to have him, and so, without further adieu, Professor 
Anderson.
PROFESSOR ANDERSON: Thank you and I’m going to also be very brief  in order to get us on to 
the panel. I think actually most of  you know me here, if  you are students, as a corporate law profes-
sor. And in fact, I look across the room and I see various people in my business law classes.
I actually have a very split personality between this sort of  national security side and the corporate 
side. And in general, I guess, I would say that I’m interested in money and violence. 
This particular conference I would like, first of  all, to welcome everybody and I would like to thank 
the two student organizations that have put this together because when I looked at the lineup for 
this and had been invited just to deliver these brief  opening remarks, it caused me to actually go and 
change a talk that I was supposed to give someplace else until next week because I thought these are 
absolutely just fabulous panels. 
Let me say why I think the organization of  this conference is exactly spot on for how we need 
to start addressing the cyber issues. This is the first of  really three points that I just want to make 
substantively by way of  introduction to the day. The first is that the two panels this morning address 
the international law side. And in the afternoon, ask, I think – and under “ask,” questioned in all of  
this – whether and to what extent it’s possible for domestic law to be able to address these questions. 
And I think that that’s actually an under-discussed aspect of  this when it comes to the questions, not 
only of  the sort of  all the domestic issues that we’ve been talking about – privacy and surveillance 
and other kinds of  stuff  in the cyber area – but including the questions of  thresholds of  war, other 
kinds of  responses, the way in which one has to see an array of  responses, some of  which are es-
sentially driven by concerns out of  international law, but others of  which, perhaps, are really driven 
by paradigms of  domestic law. 
So I think that that actually frames the question in a very important way, and I would stress that I 
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think that it’s actually under-asked in a lot of  the circles here. 
The second point that I want to make about these things is to locate cyber warfare, or let’s say cyber 
operations because I don’t want to actually suggest that everything is war. I mean we do it that way 
colloquially and I think that it’s fine, but to be more precise, we just want to say cyber operations 
that may be characterized legally in one way or another. 
Cyber is not the only emerging new military technology out there. So, as we think about the emerg-
ing technologies, we think about cyber, but we also wind up thinking, of  course, about drones and 
remotely piloted vehicles as we are aware of  them, but also the next couple of  generations of  what 
this technology will look like. This is going to wind up ranging from the things that get smaller and 
smaller in this kind of  technological development. Meanwhile, some things get bigger, so you can 
have things that are fairly gigantic circling around doing surveillance at a very large level. Other 
aspects of  the way in which these technologies wind up developing are still rooted around some no-
tion of  being remotely piloted. 
And then finally, this technology will become more diffuse because it runs across different kinds of  
actual weapons in the general trend of  military affairs but also because it’s in everything else in terms 
of  innovation and the economy and technology. This general trend is towards automation: the auto-
mating of  systems, perhaps even leading to something that we would describe as fully autonomous 
systems. Systems that are able to, in effect, go beyond a set programming in order to actually make 
decisions that are not themselves fully predictable in advance, according to a rigid machine program-
ming. 
That’s the direction that an awful lot of  stuff  is headed at this point, and it will have impacts on lots 
of  different things in the military because it’s going to have impacts on, for example, weapons sys-
tems. Should we ever wind up reaching the point of  fully automating the decision to fire a weapon? 
It will wind up impacting not just the weapons themselves but also the platforms used in drones or 
other kinds of  weapons systems. 
We normally think about things that fly around, but remember the driverless cars that Google is 
driving all over San Francisco for hundreds of  thousands of  hours at this point - without a crash, by 
the way? First of  all, the engineers and the basis for that driverless car get going in military research 
and development programs. We tend to assume that because it’s Google, it can’t possibly be evil 
or frankly ever raise any sort of  ethical questions, but the reality is that many of  the technologies 
involved in driverless cars have enormously important applications in military technologies, as well. 
And the driverless cars themselves, they’re actually grounded in DARPA research. That is going to 
obviously transform civilian transportation. Drones are going to transform civilian aviation, if  not 
general aviation, and in that process of  automation, these things are going to be actually relatively 
small parts – i.e., the military parts will relatively small parts of  much larger transformations towards 
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automation but are just part of  the way the world is going to work. We eventually will be replaced by 
robots; get used to it. 
Now, these three different trends – the trend towards automation, perhaps even autonomy in mili-
tary affairs and specific technologies in drones, and specific technologies in the area of  cyber – these 
things wind up having enormous differences between them. So, for example, cyber can be extraor-
dinarily targeted, but when we talk about many of  the fears, concerns, and risks – the things that 
cause governments to draw red lines in the sand and to say we will consider this an act of  war, they 
are very often based not on account of  the fact that cyber is discreetly targeted towards some very 
particular, narrow thing.  On the contrary, it’s because we’re worried about massively indiscriminant 
effects on the civilian infrastructure. What’s striking is those possibilities, and the fears of  these 
possibilities tend to be one of  the drivers for why we wind up talking about whether this might be 
considered an act of  war.
Drone technology, on the other hand, is really very much about precision. The whole point about 
drone technology is to narrow the focus of  the kinetic strike down to getting it as precise as pos-
sible. That would be a difference between these areas.
But one of  the things that I think that is shared between these things, and again, looking sort of  
the larger picture and not just at cyber, is the extent to which these kinds of  technologies enable, in 
the first place, remoteness, or the ability to attack from a distance, which itself  is actually not new. I 
mean from the moment that somebody picked up a spear and went whoosh or somebody invented 
a bow and arrow and got behind a rock and said, “Hurray, I can kill you but you can’t get close 
enough to me.” From the moment that happened a long long time ago, we’ve been looking at ways 
in order to strike from remote distance, and these technologies, in a certain sense, are just carrying 
that to a sort of  logical further extreme. 
But they also, to some degree, greater or lesser, wind up making it more difficult to identify who’s 
launching the attack. So it’s not just a question of  remoteness, it’s also a question of  the ability to 
attribute attacks to a particular party. And that has the possibility, at least depending on how true 
that is, of  using the drone, and maybe obliterating it or flying it out of  the zone or doing something 
with it that gets rid of  it, and simply blandly denying that you had anything to do with the killing that 
took place. And can that possibility be very destabilizing in terms of  international relations in regard 
to war and peace because you can’t so definitively say who did the killing? Who do you attribute the 
attack to? Who do you retaliate against? Who do you hold responsible?
Cyber has also, and if  anything, been seen as the most scary in the lack of  attribution problem 
although – and I think the panelists will perhaps address this – it is perhaps less of  one than might 
have been thought. 
Those are areas in which one looks across different kinds of  military applications of  emerging 
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technologies to see commonalities. And my only point here is to wind up locating cyber within this 
sort of  larger picture, [as a type of  emerging military technology]. Again, I want to congratulate our 
student organizations for putting on a spectacular panel, and also to thank the panelists today and in 
the afternoon for being here for that. 
So I’m going to turn it over to the panel and thank you all for being here. 
DAN SCHNEIDER: Thank you Ken. My name is Dan Schneider. I’m a Professor at the School of  
International Service at AU and Director of  our Center on Non-Traditional Threats and Corrup-
tion. What’s a non-traditional threat? Well, what we’re going to be talking about today is a perfect 
example of  a non-traditional threat. 
I’m essentially going to get out of  the way. How we’ll proceed today is each of  the panelists will 
speak for about ten minutes, and then we’re going to open up to questions. Let me introduce each 
of  the panelists. I won’t go through all of  their accomplishments because then that wouldn’t leave 
any time for them to talk, but we have a really incredible panel here today. So let me just give you 
some of  their highlights.
Starting with Chuck Barry in the middle here. He’s a Senior Fellow at the Center for Technology and 
National Security Policy at the National Defense University here in Washington. He has conducted 
research on defense related network integration and security for the past ten years with a special 
emphasis on NATO network defense against cyber attacks. He was a visiting fellow at the Woodrow 
Wilson Center from 2004 – 2006. He’s also a retired career soldier with combat experience both as 
an infantry soldier and as a helicopter pilot. I would love to hear about that in another forum. He 
served for 12 years overseas – Africa, Central America, Asia, and Europe. 
To my immediate left, Greg McNeil, from Pepperdine. Greg is Associate Professor of  Law at 
Pepperdine where he specifically focuses on national security issues, transnational crime and inter-
national affairs. He has recently testified before Congress regarding cyber terrorism. He’s advised 
members of  Congress during the development of  cyber security legislation, and recently served 
as an expert commentator and assisted the military in their development of  two manuals aimed at 
preventing harm to civilians in warfare. Previously, he was co-director of  a transnational counterter-
rorism program for the U. S. Department of  Justice, my former employer. He’s also a contributor to 
Forbes magazine. His current research includes an article entitled, “Kill-Lists and Accountability,” 
and a book about the investigation and prosecution of  national security related crimes, which will 
be published by Oxford University Press. Professor McNeil also served as an officer in the United 
States Army.
Last, but not least, is Paul Rosenzweig, who is a Professorial Lecturer at George Washington Univer-
sity School of  Law. He’s also the founder of  Red Ranch Law and Consulting. He formerly served as 
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the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of  Homeland Security just down the 
road. And twice he was Acting Assistant Secretary for International Affairs at DHS. In these posi-
tions, he was responsible for developing policy, strategic plans, and international approaches – the 
entire gamut of  Homeland Security activities. He’s a graduate of  the University of  Chicago Law 
School and is co-author of  the book, Winning the Law on War: Lessons from the Cold War for Defeating 
Terrorism and Preserving Freedom, and author of  the forthcoming book, Cyber Warfare, How Conflicts in 
Cyber Space are Challenging America and Changing the World. 
DAN SCHNEIDER: The topic of  this morning’s panel is When is a Virus a War Crime? Target-
ability and Collateral Damage Under the Law of  Armed Conflict. Very briefly, the laws of  armed 
conflict, as they develop may be over the past, since the 1860’s or so, were designed when war was 
kinetic, energy driven; things blow up. Not designed because no one could have even conceived not 
only back in the 1860’s, but even maybe 30 years ago about cyber warfare. These laws were designed 
during a very different era. But some of  the main principles of  the laws of  war, think about them, 
are things like proportionality. You do not deliberately target. 
One interesting provision of  laws of  conducting war is that soldiers wear uniforms so they can be 
identified and separate themselves from civilians so the other side knows who to target, who to at-
tack. Well, the attribution problem is not nearly as severe as it used to be, to the surprise of  many, 
but still the people initiating attacks are not wearing uniforms. So that’s just some of  the many things 
to be considered in the talk today. 
We’re going to proceed in alphabetical order. Each speaker will speak for about ten minutes. And 
then we’re going to devote the rest of  the time to questions from the audience. So we will start with 
Chuck. Chuck just realized he has to go first. 
CHUCK BARRY: Thank you very much Dan and thank you to the Washington College of  Law for 
inviting me here today. As you know from my bio, I’m not a legal expert and I’m also not a techni-
cian in cyber weapons or a user of  cyber weapons. But I have spent a number of  years, ten years 
about over at the National University as a student of  the application of  cyber in armed conflict, 
and that’s kind of  what I bring to you today, that experience. And also working, since 2009, in an 
international forum with the East-West Institute where we’ve been talking specifically to our Russian 
counterparts at the Moscow State University. And also counterparts in other countries, to include 
China, on how you might render the laws of  armed conflict in cyber space.
And in the context of  that, we’ve been wrestling with our counterparts in these various countries 
with how you might define things such as offensive capability, defensive capability, cyber attack, 
and things of  that nature. And we have actually come to some agreement realizing that this is just a 
couple of  groups of  Americans and interested Russians. At the same time, we realize that our coun-
terparts are very closely connected in the Kremlin and we ourselves are wholly owned subsidiary of  
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the Department of  Defense. So there is some inside or a possibility that this is the beginnings of  
discussion.
The other thing that’s encouraging I think about this idea of  cyber warfare being subject to the laws 
of  armed conflicts is that the laws themselves, as Dan was pointing out, began about a century and 
a half  ago. They started out with land warfare. They migrated in to the naval environment. Later on 
there was the arrival of  air power and much more recently space and now finding cyber space. So 
they have been able to adapt over this long period of  time to the point where you have a rather large 
body of  law.
A caution is that even those laws that we have today are not so precise or cut and dry, for example, 
the idea of  proportionality basically says that there can be some incidental civilian loss of  life or in-
jury or damage to civilian objects, but it cannot be excesses to the military purpose. Well those types 
of  things, particularly here in the law school, I’m sure you can realize that there is room for a lot of  
interpretation there. So we have both some encouraging things and some things to keep in mind. 
The groups that I’ve been working with include combat veterans, not only on our American side, 
but also in some of  these other countries, including Russia. So the bias of  our group, I would sug-
gest, is probably more towards the pragmatic application realizing that in some complex and some-
times extreme circumstances, it’s very hard for practitioners to apply this. But there’s a lot of  tech-
nology that’s working in this direction. 
Some officials, most recently perhaps Secretary Panetta, have pointed out that indeed there could be 
a cyber Pearl Harbor. Madeline Albright pointed out in 2010, in leading the group of  government 
experts in the discussion of  the future of  the NATO Alliance, that indeed some Article 5, that is to 
say, justification for a response against a territorial threat, could emanate from cyberspace. So we can 
foresee that in the future this might happen. 
At the same time, pragmatically speaking, nothing has risen to this level to date to include, for ex-
ample, the attack in Estonia, which was actually very harmful to them, but was very limited. Over a 
few weeks, a few very important websites, I believe in those attacks, were attacked in not a continu-
ous, but rather a sporadic manner. 
We have to understand things like Titan Rain, the attack against our own major defense contractors 
for secrets and things like the most significant attack in 2008 against the Department of  Defense 
known as Buckshot Yankee. It is important to understand things of  this nature and to not allow 
them to cause us to say, “Well we’re in an armed conflict.” We also need to understand the recent 
issue of  Stuxnet in Iran as well as the more recent Shamoon Virus attack against energy companies, 
which have not triggered armed conflicts. 
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So what are the events that we might foresee that would trigger the application of  the laws of  armed 
conflict - Jus ad bellum? what would constitute a response in self-defense? Well, we have to theorize 
about this just yet, and we would suggest that if  a cyber event resulted in significant losses of  life, 
the same principles that apply to other attacks – destruction of  property, extensive destruction of  
the way of  life of  a country or its ability to maintain its prosperity – apply. These are the kinds of  
things that we can look for, and I would suggest to you that we probably will not see. As for its fu-
ture, we won’t know. But we probably would not expect to see a purely cyber war because what that 
would suggest is that I will leave on the table all my other capabilities in the other domains. And if  
my national interests are truly at risk, then that is not really the definition of  a war.
We would expect to see cyber conducted in context of  a broader kinetic war. And this is not un-
usual. If  someone attacks from the land, then we might respond in the air already. So this kind of  
cross-domain kind of  conflict is there.
The other thing to realize is there’s a – and over at the National Defense University we talk about 
this a lot because we have our military students there – close relationship between the electronic 
warfare and the cyber domain, which is clearly distinct today. But electronic warfare goes back to 
the days of  cutting telegraph wires in the civil war. And we’ve had electronic warfare measures and 
countermeasures for many decades. They’re a major component of  any military plan. 
And at the same time, today’s weapons, almost every single weapon, every missile hanging out on the 
wing of  an aircraft, virtually almost every weapon that even a soldier wears has a cyber component; 
something that can be disturbed in cyberspace. So these things will migrate together. The important 
piece as we talk about targetability is to target the military objects and not the civilian objects. 
Attribution is – and it was mentioned already by Ken, but I’ll just touch on it briefly – becoming eas-
ier. And I would submit to you that even on the day of  December 7, 1941 when the Japanese fleet 
attacked Pearl Harbor, we didn’t need perfect intelligence to know that this was not some renegade 
Admiral. We immediately knew that Japan was behind the attacks. 
The attribution is never perfect. It need not be beyond a reasonable doubt. Part of  the issues in 
cyberspace is who could be the attacker, who stands to benefit, who has the wherewithal to do these 
things? But once you get to this situation and you have an armed conflict, probably more evident in 
the other domains, then you become subject to these rules of  jus in bello, and we have to think about 
three major pieces of  that. One is the distinction we cannot attack civilian targets, but the other is 
that we can attack military targets. This is why we have things such as red crosses on ambulances and 
Medi-Vac helicopters and hospitals.
The next point is that we cannot be indiscriminate and this is a particular issue in cyberspace because 
you cannot use a weapon that you do not have good reasonable possibilities of  directing it against 
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a military target. You can’t go indiscriminately to everything. This is an issue with viruses. We talked 
earlier about the issue of  proportionality with incidental or how much civilian casualty might be in-
appropriate. This is particularly true today. We see this in the issue of  drones. We can talk about that 
because there are a lot of  other robotics on the battlefield to include autonomous undersea systems. 
In fact, a typical brigade in the field has some 300 robots now. 
I’ll just mention a problem here in tagging cyber, for example, on a medical database for a hospital 
that’s conducting an operation, is how do you put that red cross on a database? 
In our discussions with Russian colleagues in rendering of  the laws of  armed conflict, we made five 
recommendations. (These documents are available on the EastWest Institute’s website.) We recom-
mended that further international work be done on detangling protected entities, civilian entities, 
from military entities. Right now, the NATO headquarters is on the same power grids and servers 
and routers and switches as the local hospital and the airport and so forth. So we need to try and 
look at detanglement. 
We suggested we look at getting the distinctive Geneva Convention’s emblems rendered in cyber-
space in some way – tagging on top-level domain names or things of  this nature. We talked about 
recognizing both the rights and responsibilities of  new non-state actors such as multi-national cor-
porations or non-governmental organizations, and considered what are their responsibilities in cyber 
space. We talked about developing the Geneva Convention protocols further about cyber weapons. 
Some weapons, conventional weapons are prohibited, such as gas and certain types of  projectiles, 
because they inflict undue suffering. So what cyber weapons fall in that category? And finally we 
talked about the possibility of  another mode out here. Maybe because of  this extensive espionage 
and so forth, we’re not talking anymore about peace and war, but there’s something in between that 
needs to be articulated. 
Let me stop there and I look forward to your questions and the others. 
DAN SCHNEIDER: Thank you Chuck. 
GREG MCNEIL: Good morning everyone. So I’m thinking back now to one of  my first experi-
ences as an Army Officer. So I was actually a Signal Officer. I did communications when I was in the 
Army, and I was stationed in Korea. My first assignment as a 2LT Platoon Leader, I’m put in charge 
of  46 soldiers and 16 civilians who were responsible for basically all of  the communications from 
a base called Camp Red Cloud north to the demilitarized zone. We had 10,000 military customers 
in 2nd Infantry Division, and my responsibility was to make sure that the secure network and the 
nonsecure network continued to function so that the war fighter could continue to be able to com-
municate. 
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At the time, I’m dating this girl. Her name was Melissa. And I get an e-mail in my inbox. Those of  
you who are tech geeks probably know where I’m taking this story. And the e-mail comes in my 
inbox and the subject line is – it’s from Melissa – and the subject line is “I love you.” And I’m think-
ing this is great. I miss you. I love you. She’s home. She’s in Pennsylvania, I’m in Korea. I can’t wait 
to open this e-mail. So I open it and it immediately starts populating through my Outlook address 
book. The virus was the Melissa virus that was contained in the e-mail.
Now, not only is this like a stupid mistake for me, infrastructure-wise, it was pretty stupid that some 
2LT straight out of  the Officer Basic Course right out of  college, 23-years old has an Outlook ad-
dress book that has every single officer and civilian and NCO in Korea from the 4-Star General on 
down to the PFC who worked for me. 
But in any case I opened it up and out starts flying 10,000 e-mails from my computer. So what I 
do…unplug my computer and sit and think for a second about how I’m going to fix my computer. 
And then I realize, holy crap; I’m responsible for all of  these computers. Obviously I have a Com-
pany Commander, a bunch of  people up the line above me whose head would roll before mine did. 
What I do is I take off  out of  my office, which used to be an arms locker. So it was just a window-
less safe, I’ve run out of  my safe. I run to our bunker in the side of  a mountain that wouldn’t stop 
a bomb if  it hit it, but it was cool because it was a bunker. Get in to the facility and I’m telling my 
NCOs, just unplug the computers because there was nothing else you could do. And so we did. We 
unplugged, I mean this is an hour and a half, two hours into this, and we unplugged the network. 
Effectively, an “I love you” virus shut down the NPR net and the SPR net for the northern third 
of  the South Korean portion of  the Korean Peninsula. That would be the way that we would send 
secure communication, and it was all through Microsoft Outlook e-mail, which we didn’t have. 
And so, now it was go back on phones and go back on radio communication until we could get the 
network back up and figure out then how to go through individual accounts cleaning out this virus 
so it wouldn’t keep reperpetuating itself. 
I mean imagine: you could still send e-mail. It wouldn’t have been shut down if  we hadn’t unplugged 
it. Imagine you’re the general and you have to sort through 10,000 e-mails from 10,000 people. Do 
that math and see how it keeps populating. How are you going to find the important message in 
there? 
So it was a big deal for us. It was sort of  emblematic of  how some things small and silly can take 
advantage of  [vulnerabilities] – and I don’t think this was attributed to any nation state, I think it 
was just some, probably some 14-year old who was playing around on their computer and figured 
out how to make a really great virus that would mess with people and found this vulnerability and 
exploited it. But it shows how you can disrupt military operations. 
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Now would that be characterized as a cyber attack? You might be thinking, “Yeah. Definitely. I think 
that’s probably a cyber attack. It disabled the military forces.” That’s one way of  looking at it. Or 
you can just look at it as being annoying and all it required us to do was unplug this, get the new fix 
patch from Norton, and install it on our systems. I mean the military didn’t figure out the fix. Nor-
ton Antivirus techs figured it out and posted it to the Symantec website. 
Let me walk through a little bit of  my sense of  the law on this and in particular the law of  targeting 
and how it helps to inform us of  something about that type of  attack and other types of  cyber at-
tacks; that type of  operation and cyber attacks. 
The question is whether the law of  armed conflict provides sufficient guidance here. I’d say yes; Ad-
ditional Protocol I, Article 49-1 defines an attack as “Acts of  violence against the adversary whether 
in offense or defense.” So the key issue in analyzing this provision, I think most scholars agree and 
most practitioners too, is the effect or the violent consequences directed at the target. And so we’re 
looking at what the particular effect is and how we measure this or identify it as an attack, as an ef-
fect on persons, death or injury, and damage or destruction of  property. So that’s our threshold issue 
that we’re looking for. Did cyber activity cause death, injury, damage or destruction to the adversary? 
That adversary could be a party to the conflict, their military forces. It could be civilians or civil-
ian objects or civilian infrastructure. If  we satisfy those criteria we can say that this maybe an attack 
under international law.
Now this is a little bit of  a departure from what the current military doctrine is where that doctrine 
identifies cyber attacks as efforts to disrupt, deny, degrade or destroy an operation as a matter of  
military doctrine. That’s an okay way to characterize this, but I don’t think those two overlap com-
pletely. There are some areas in which they certainly do overlap. Thus, one of  the immediate chal-
lenges associated with applying the law of  armed conflict here. It’s characterizing what is meant by 
“damage.” 
You might think that Melissa Virus I described caused damage, but I think there’s a lot of  room for 
us to disagree about whether or not there was some actual damage there. If  you recall, you suggest 
that we look to death, injury, damage or destruction. The most difficult of  these, then is to assess 
this damage. So cyber attack might merely change a line of  code. It might start populating itself  
through the Outlook address book as I mentioned. And if  one were to take a narrow view, we might 
look at this and only see the immediate effect of  changing that code and perhaps causing a system to 
reset, a program to crash, an Outlook address book to start populating messages out. And so in the 
same way that one might foresee, let’s say firing a bullet in to an electrical substation, will only take 
out that substation, we also have to assess what the cascading effects of  that particular attack was. 
So if  I only take a narrow view and look at that e-mail example I gave you, then it was a big hassle 
for the e-mail chain. But if  that somehow caused other systems to shut down but then caused dam-
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age, then we might be able to characterize this as an attack and we might say that the cyber operator 
would be held to account for the reasonable foreseeable consequences and damage of  their targeting 
decision.
The cascading effects are probably the easier effect. What if  we’re just going to look at the type of  
damage that we don’t normally associate with armed conflict? Let’s go back to my e-mail example or 
let’s say that there’s a cyber operation that just temporarily disables an enemy system. Could this be 
considered an armed attack? Let’s think of  a denial of  service attack on a military web site.
On the one hand, Article 52 of  the Additional Protocol tells us that only those objects would make 
an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction capture or neutral-
ization offers a definite military advantage and only those targets may be attacked. And so if  we’re 
looking for neutralization we can read this broadly and say well neutralization of  the web servers 
even temporarily could constitute an armed attack. In the denial of  service attack on the defense 
website, assuming the website satisfied the effective contribution criteria, which we could have a big 
debate about. The fact that the DDS attack merely neutralized the web page probably doesn’t fall 
outside the scope of  armed conflict. That’s one view.
On the other hand, as Professor Mike Schmidt of  Naval War Colleges played it out, such an attack 
would merely be an inconvenience, and armed conflict is frequently inconvenient. The issue we have 
here is this [reasoning] skips part of  the analysis. 
Our threshold question is whether an attack is actually being conducted. Article 52-2 speaks to mili-
tary objects. Defines them as “Those which may be attacked,” and those are the objectives that only 
may be attacked in armed conflict. So looking at 52-2 to try and define for us whether an attack is 
going, skips our threshold question with regards to the damage provision. 
In reality, our focus has to be what’s being damaged and that will define for us whether or not this 
cyber operation rises to the level of  an armed conflict. It doesn’t mean that it doesn’t further some 
other national goals, but if  we want to trigger the law of  armed conflict, we have to do so by looking 
to the scope of  the damage that’s occurred.
What we can do is start to lay down some clear markers. Operations causing damage to software that 
require repairs, damage to computer hardware, or other physical damage seem to rise to the level or 
a cyber attack. That’s on one side. However, operations that merely cause inconvenience –the need 
to reboot, something that might delete nonessential information such as the server logs or history 
– doesn’t make that deletion of  that information rise to the level of  a cyber attack. In other words, 
inconvenience doesn’t count as an attack. 
You can see the areas where this gets muddy. Professor Anderson alluded to some of  the drone con-
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text. One of  the things that anti-drone activists now are arguing is that we can also count as victims 
of  drone strikes and drone surveillance those individuals who are experiential victims of  the drones 
flying overhead. That is, I woke up every day, I saw a drone, and that emotionally traumatizes me. It’s 
a stretch, and I think you can start to see some people trying to stretch the domain of  cyber attacks 
for a variety of  intergovernmental reasons. The more things are characterized as cyber attacks, the 
more money flows to cyber command to handle those issues and the less money flows out of  DHS 
pockets. This is why a lot of  this stuff  is, I’d say, puffery on the parts of  different agencies seek-
ing to maximize their budgets and take control of  certain issues. So we have to be careful to define 
cyber attacks appropriately here.
Now it’s possible that you might have a denial of  service attack that somehow takes out an anti-
aircraft system. I’m not sure how that would happen, but if  we thought about how we might have 
a cascading effect, it took out some computer systems or prevented those systems from operating, 
then – because there would be some clear damage to something that would contribute to the armed 
forces of  the defender, the target being attacked – we might have crossed the line. But you can kind 
of  see the boundaries that I’m hoping that will throw down.
This means that snooping and other types of  intrusions, data theft, the type of  stuff  that you see 
frequently being talked about on the Homeland Security side and on the private side, denial of  
service attacks, many of  these are not matters governed by the law of  armed conflict and do not 
constitute cyber attacks. While those operations which cause death injury or destruction, I would say, 
do rise to the level of  cyber attack. 
Now merely characterizing these issues doesn’t fully get us through the law of  armed conflict analy-
sis. We also have to apply the laws governing the targeting to the cyber context. And so some of  this 
has already been mentioned, but obviously only combatants, civilians directly participating in hostili-
ties, or military objectives may be targeted. This is the principle of  distinction. 
Now, it’s possible that civilians will be impacted by cyber operations, particularly cyber operations 
designed to influence the population. We think of  these as psychological operations or information 
operations in military terms. If  those operations cross the line to threats meant to terrorize the civil-
ian population, then we might have a law of  armed conflict issue violation of  Article 51-2. But the 
fact that this was a cyber operation doesn’t change the analysis. We’re looking at whether or not the 
operation was intended to terrorize the population.
Then we also have another step in our analysis, which is to take into account the cascading effects 
that I alluded to earlier because cyber operations generally have multiple orders of  effect. [For in-
stance,] an operation was conducted to take out a particular line of  code in a computer system. The 
cyber attacker also has to take in to account the fact that there may be cascading effects from that. 
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Step 1. I might look at the attack whether or not the attack on the computer system itself  was lawful. 
But then if  I also want to implement my obligations with regard to the principle of  proportionality, 
I also have to ask whether the second order effects – the incidental or collateral effects – will have 
impacted civilian objects. 
Maybe I take out a computer system, which then shuts down a military electrical grid. Well if  that 
military electrical grid is now somehow connected to the civilian electrical grid or connected to 
something else, which is then connected to the civilian electrical grid, I have to take steps to be sure 
that I’m accounting for those collateral effects in the conduct of  my targeting. If  there is any third, 
or fourth, or even tenth order effect, is that something that was reasonably knowable on the part 
of  the attacker in that context? That’s something that is going to require substantial effort on the 
part of  the attacking party to make those types of  determinations. Presuming there is such a third 
or fourth or even tenth order effect, it doesn’t mean that I can’t go forward with the cyber opera-
tion; I just have to weigh whether the damage is disproportionate when weighed against the concrete 
military advantage to be achieved. 
The practical challenge here will be using all available information for the United States, all available 
information in the hands of  the United States Government to determine the cascading effects. Just 
think of  the 2002 blackout that took out Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New York City for five or six days 
in the summer time. It was caused by a branch that took out an electrical line somewhere in Ohio on 
a day of  high capacity, and it shut down systems across the northeast for five days. Well if  a branch 
can do that, then you similarly would expect that some shut down or overloading of  a substation 
might do that and therefore you might have to take care to ensure that you’re weighing all of  those 
cascading effects in terms of  analyzing the proportionality of  your particular attack.
The law of  [armed] conflict also deals with dual use objects. It defines those as, “those whose na-
ture, location, and purpose reviews make an effective contribution to military action in the destruc-
tion of  which offers a definite military advantage.” Those are objects irrespective of  the additional 
civilian uses which maybe attacked. The big problem here that we’re going to start to see is that we 
have many networks and computer facilities, which host both civilian and military traffic.  In the 
United States, more than half  of  the military traffic transmits commercial networks. Actually, it 
might be higher than that. I imagine Paul would know better than I would. And a substantial amount 
of  storage is done on commercial servers. 
Take Amazon Cloud services. A substantial portion of  their business is to house military servers, 
even secure servers. An attack on that server facility is an attack on Amazon but also an attack on a 
military facility. This actually highlights part of  the inner bureaucratic fight.
If  I’m DHS I say, “It’s Amazon. We own that. It’s inside the United States. It’s our area of  respon-
sibility and we need 10 million line items in the budget to be able to effectively respond to and deal 
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with this.” And if  I’m DoD I say, “Yeah, okay, it’s Amazon Cloud Services, but my SPRnet runs on 
that or my intelligence databases run on that.” Therefore, all these targeting issues require a substan-
tial intelligence effort for us to assess where attackers are going, whether or not we’re dealing with a 
civilian object, a dual use object, or a purely military object meant to analyze the cascading effects. 
PAUL ROSENZWEIG: HoneyCloud.net. has a map in real time of  attacks that are happening right 
now in the world. It’s but a small sample of  what is happening because the Honey Cloud program 
is just a few reporters; not everybody. All the red [dots] are attacks. And the yellow ones are Honey 
Nets and Honey Pots where the malware is being captured. 
So here’s the question. Is that war? It’s certainly a whole lot of  activity. But what I would suggest to 
you is definitions of  warfare are inadequate to the current state of  affairs. I want to emphasize at the 
beginning that we’re stuck with them because we’re not going to build a whole new set of  defini-
tions, but we are in the process of  pouring new wine into old bottles with limited success I would 
submit.
To just jump off  of  what Greg said in talking about an attack as being one that causes damage and 
destruction, the United States has attacked Iran, yet we’re not at war. I would submit that we have 
not seen a cyber war. We will not see a standalone cyber war, and what we should be talking about is 
the use of  cyber weaponry, cyber operations, and cyber tactics and whether or not they conform to 
acceptable rules of  conduct.
Now again, I think that the existing sets of  rules are ones that we’re sort of  stuck with, but in a lot 
of  ways, they don’t fit very well at all and eventually – I mean to put it in the legal terms that interna-
tional law students will – we’re going to develop another set of  customary international practice that 
is completely different. We’re going to try for the next five years to fit it in to the Geneva Conven-
tions and the additional protocols and all that, and the international IHL and even International 
Human Rights Law, but we won’t succeed. 
So for example, this panel begins with the question can a virus be a war crime? I suppose I fight 
the question somewhat, but the answer is obvious. Of  course it can be. But like almost any other 
weapon, it really is going to depend completely on the context in which it’s used, how it’s used, who 
it’s used against, and when and why it’s used for. My basic answer is in general, it’s probably a lot less 
likely to ever be a war crime. Use of  cyber weapons is less likely to ever be a war crime than a whole 
host of  other kinetic weapons because they are inherently generally capable of  greater precision and 
target-ability and therefore better able to meet current principles of  distinction and proportionality. 
That doesn’t mean that bad actors won’t use them in malevolent ways that are broad spectrum any-
more that it doesn’t mean that some bad actor might carpet bomb and entire country just because 
they’re angry about a single intrusion. Or use them to commit genocide or anything like that. But 
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cyber viruses are inherently program specific.
You think about Stuxnet. It’s one that’s in the public domain. That was a very precisely targeted 
virus. It wound up infecting a lot of  computers, about 100,000 servers and hosts around the globe. 
But in so far as the public knows, and we can only go on that, only in one single system, in one sin-
gle place, did it actually turn on and have adverse malicious effects. So that’s a pretty good targetabil-
ity. In fact, one of  the questions that will come that is sort of  inherent both in viruses and in drones 
is whether or not our increasing ability to do targetability more narrowly imposes on us greater 
obligations to avoid collateral damages and whether or not you get punished for being smarter be-
cause you have to start using more smarter narrowly targeted weapons. That’s the type of  discussion 
that we probably will have, but it isn’t a discussion grounded in, in my judgment, the existing laws of  
armed conflict so much as in the inherent capabilities of  the cyber domain. 
Another area that is worth talking about where the laws of  our conflict are, to my mind, sort of  
inadequate or failed to recognize the reality of  where we are: it’s the question of  attribution. Both 
Chuck and Greg have mentioned that. I think that increasingly we’re going to come to see two dif-
ferent types of  attribution issues here. The way I think of  it and the way I analogize for the law stu-
dents is the difference between general deterrence and specific deterrence. We know of  a certainty 
that China is hacking us beyond belief. There are dozens of  hackers around. It is so much so that in 
any reasonable judgment, the Chinese denials of  state responsibility are but the barest fig leaf. 
Now there diplomatic reasons why we may want to continue to accept that fig leaf  but that’s another 
question altogether. If  the question is can we conclusively attribute the ongoing espionage program 
to China, the answer, by any reasonable, beyond a reasonable doubt has to be “yes.” The more 
specific narrower question is can we pick out five people or ten people who are responsible. Up 
until a couple of  years ago, the answer was probably, but that’s really hard. Increasingly, that too is 
becoming less difficult. Public reports suggest that the NSA has, through its magical means, identi-
fied 12 specific hacker groups within China who have responsibility for 90 percent of  the economic 
espionage. Almost all of  them have associated with Szechuan University, which has an information 
security program that is supposed to be or is likely to be a covert arm of  the PLA. Thus, we know 
the groups, and we even know some of  the people.
The New York Times actually called one of  them up the other day and said, “Hello, are you the 
hacker, Scuhkr”…S-c-u-h-k-r was his name for Szechuan University Hacker and he was smart 
enough to notice a “No comment.” So at least he knew a little bit about that.
The Georgians recently counterhacked a Russian. The Georgians actually identified a single hacker 
and downloaded the contents of  his computer by counteracting. They larded a document with Hon-
ey Pot Document containing a malicious program that opened up his own browser. We got a screen 
shot capture of  him looking quite surprised, and they downloaded the contents of  his computer 
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which gave evidence that he was taking directions from his local GRU – that’s the Russian equivalent 
of  MI 5 or MI6 – on what to hack for in Georgia.
We can attribute him. Now that leads to the next question. Which is all these people, everybody, they 
don’t wear uniforms. This guy didn’t. We’re going to need a new category of  combatants. That’s the 
cyber combatant because they’re not wearing uniforms. They’re not playing the game by the Geneva 
Convention rules of  carrying arms openly and that sort of  stuff. But they aren’t traditional civil-
ians. The current traditional rules say the civilian is targetable only when he’s actively engaged in the 
warlike activity. But as soon as he downs arms and goes home to his house, he no longer becomes a 
target. If  he downs arms and goes home, he is immune from attack. 
That maybe made sense when a guerrilla picked up arms, went to fight against the invading army 
and then went home to his house to his wife and kids. Now he fights from his home sitting at the 
computer next to his wife and kids. We need a new set of  rules. Again, it seems to me kind of  sterile 
to talk about existing categories of  conflict when the right answers are that there are different rules. 
I will end with two other examples that I think are perfectly good examples of  why the old rules 
need to be re-thought. One is the principle of  neutrality. World War I to a large degree was exacer-
bated by German invasion of  Belgium and the violation of  their neutrality. Yet, there is no way to 
conduct an effective cyber attack today without, in some sense, violating the principle of  neutrality. 
Nobody in his or her right mind hops directly from the United States to China to conduct an at-
tack. We always go through Malaysia or India, or Japan, or Belarus. So wherever it is we want to go 
through in order to try and mask our activity. All of  those are probably, under current law, violations 
of  the sovereign integrity of  the country involved. 
Now, we could try and reconfigure that and say, “No, it’s more like radio waves going across the air 
waves. So it is not a violation.” However, the truth of  the matter is that Air Force and Justice De-
partment attorneys actually think that we can’t do that right now because the laws of  armed conflict 
limit our activity. I think that that’s probably the fair interpretation of  the Geneva Convention rules 
to which I say okay; those rules don’t fit anymore. We should be going about thinking about things. 
DAN SCHNEIDER: Thank you. Let’s line up for questions, and we’ll take a couple at a time. While 
you’re doing that since this is law school audience, I want to give a slight hypothetical; just like on a 
final exam where you walk us through the analysis. Let’s take Stuxnet. You have an attribution issue 
– Israel and/or United States – but also the target, if  you believe they’re any, was a civilian target 
because they are maintaining that they are nuclear program. It’s a civilian program being developed 
for peaceful, lawful purposes. 
Under current laws of  war, is that a war crime to deliberately target a civilian facility? Does anyone 
want to take a crack at that? 
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GREG MCNEIL: So if  I start from the presumption that it’s purely a civilian facility then yes, the 
attack on civilian on the facility, any civilian facilities, would be unlawful. If  it’s a military facility we 
don’t have an issue. The question becomes the dual use facility and the nature of  the dual use, and in 
which case we’d have to assess the proportionality. 
If  you tell me that millions of  Iranians are without power and people are dying, it’s like Staten Island 
a week ago but 100 times worse. Or even just Staten Island a week ago. And there’s a causal connec-
tion between that action the attacker took and the resultant deaths. I have to balance that damage as 
against the concrete military advantage they anticipate to gain. The judge of  that under Geneva Law 
is the reasonable commander in the circumstances or the reasonable attacker in the circumstances 
based on the information that they have available to them. And the only circumstance under which 
we’d see some form of  accountability through like a war crimes tribunal would then force us in to 
the box of  assessing whether or not the host state took reasonable efforts to discipline those indi-
viduals who acted despite some knowledge that these cascading effects will take place. 
As for the United States, we’re a country that takes pretty seriously disciplining individuals who 
violate the law, at least in our view. The war crimes accountability process would end if  there was 
some evidence that we knew this was going to happen ahead of  time and it was disproportionate. 
If  it were a military member, there would be UCMJ process. That might not satisfy the international 
community who would look at this and say, “Well you know, you’re violating your obligation to 
actually investigate and prosecute individuals,” in which case they would want that an international 
tribunal exercise jurisdiction. But who that international tribunal would be, would be interesting be-
cause in the United States, there is not an intention to be party to the Rome statute. Then you would 
need a Security Council referral, and we would exercise a veto on the Security Council. In the end, 
the United States would be effectively unaccountable assuming that it knew this cascading effect was 
going to happen and that the attack would have disproportionate impact on the civilian population. 
CHUCK BARRY: I take everything that Greg has said, but I would add maybe another point here 
and that is that the laws of  armed conflict presume that there is an armed conflict. And the question 
would be was the attack in response to some violation of  or something that would trigger self- de-
fense. An issue of  self  defense might be much more approximate, for example, for Israel than the 
United States. Also this goes along a little bit towards the idea of  preemptive action, which tradition-
ally has been something that is very approximate to the presence of  a threat whereas this seems to 
look out some longer period of  time. 
The main point I wanted to underscore here is that the idea of  attacking a civilian target falling 
under the laws of  armed conflict. There is this initial attack much like the idea of  Pearl Harbor al-
though the target there was military. This initiates a war if  it’s actually a bonafide attack. 
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PAUL ROSENZWEIG: I’m going to change the question because that’s what law professors do 
when they get law questions that they don’t like, but I’ll change; I was struck by agreeing with the 
analysis that Greg gave. If  you’re inside the box of  laws of  armed conflict, its clearly depends on 
the hypos of  how far down you are. I agree completely with Chuck that the main question is did we 
start the war. I think within the laws of  armed conflict we probably started it. We probably attacked, 
and it doesn’t necessarily lead to to war in the same way that every time the North Koreans shoot 
a single bullet across the DMZ constitutes an armed attack. But the South Koreans and the United 
States through our own grace, decide to refrain from response. But it’s only by grace.
But I’ll take it to the next level and ask you this question, which actually comes from a war game 
I did with some Israelis. What if  Israel seeds the Iranian oil production facilities with cyber logic 
bombs but doesn’t turn them off  at all and says, “If  you ever ever launch a missile of  any form at 
us, we’re going to destroy your entire oil production capability.” They then do one little demo just 
to make sure that everybody knows that they’re not bluffing. Is seeding, is that like mining a harbor? 
See Nicaragua vs. United States. Or is it a legitimate preemptive threat? These are questions that, again, 
I tend to think that the existing laws don’t give us good answers to. So it’s more a question to my 
mind of  what is going to become acceptable state behavior in this domain, and we’re driving ahead 
without anybody kind of  giving thought to the long-term consequences. 
If  you were to ask me, I would think that the biggest strategic mistake that the United States has 
made in recent years is in Stuxnet choice, even more so than the war in Iraq because we’ve unleashed 
the Genie. 
GREG MCNEIL: Just to respond to your hypo while people think of  their questions. The example 
you gave, sort of  the seeding – the Trojan horse waiting to be unleashed. So taking the doctrinal ap-
proach I outlined on the law of  armed conflict, there’s no damage yet other than the damage in the 
demonstration in which case that may have risen to the level of  an armed attack. 
The seeding of  the Trojan horse amongst all these facilities under a damage-based analysis doesn’t 
rise to the level of  an armed attack until the damage occurs. Now, if  I put on a different hat and I 
say what if  the Cubans were secretly placing troops inside the United States and the Soviet Union 
was moving troops in to the United States in anticipation of  an attack on Montana (where Red 
Dawn took place), what would I think about the placement of  troops on territory? 
Well there’s a sovereignty violation there that clearly amounts to an armed attack even if  the damage 
hasn’t been done yet because it’s effectively taking terrain. Could I then liken the existence of  the 
software on servers owned by the other government as an attack akin to placing troops or amassing 
troops within another nation state, even if  they got it – i.e., they just walked in without firing a shot. 
It’s like a French server. 
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In any case, so I agree with you that that would be an area where the law of  armed conflict analysis 
that I outlined doesn’t address that. 
DAN SCHNEIDER: Do you have any questions from our audience? 
QUESTION: In the face of  a cyber attack on critical infrastructure, would we be allowed to go back 
to the server from which it’s coming and try to stop the attack there? This is kind of  the hot pursuit 
question. Can you do hot pursuit in cyber space and what are the limits? 
CHUCK BARRY: Let me just counter that there was an interesting scenario very much like you just 
described on a webinar just last week done over at CSIS where role players were people like General 
Cartwright and Peter Devlin and so forth. The scenario was essentially an attack on an American oil 
company. 
They role-played very seriously in that as part of  it, they shut down communications with rigs. Ev-
erything was going haywire worldwide, the pressure valves on oil pipelines, stock prices were drop-
ping and the multinational corporation had the wherewithal to go into Venezuela and shut down 
the servers. They said we’re going to do this. And the United States said, “No, we can’t have you do 
that.” And they said, “We don’t care, we’re going.” This is your hot pursuit issue. 
Then the question would be: what is the standing of  this corporation in armed conflict if  it were to 
be such?
The interesting thing here is that it’s a role-play, so we don’t know what might have happened there, 
but so far, the Iranians have not thrown down the gauntlet and neither have we or others in subse-
quent attacks like Shamoon. Even though these attacks continued to mount, and there is damage, no 
one has decided to take this into the realm of  armed conflict other then reciprocal, perhaps, cyber 
activity which continues to go on at a noise level. This cyber activity begins to create the thought 
that maybe there is something in between kinetic war and peace where this build-up of  cyber activity 
gets more and more serious and we throw more and more eight figure budgets into defense. 
If  I can right now, I’d like to make the additional point we talk often about the offense being domi-
nant in cyber activity, and I have to say I wonder about that. The Defense Department says it’s 
attacked millions of  times a day, but it doesn’t go down even a few times a day and maybe even after 
one or two significant attacks. It would seem to me that Defense is doing a pretty good job. Except 
for the website here, the lights are not off  here and the power grids, the issues that we face in cyber 
have not demonstrated that the offense is particularly dominant. So maybe we’re willing to put up 
with these kinds of  hot pursuit actions, be it on a multi-national corporation or simply Melissa. 
GREG MCNEIL: My sense would be that the attribution problem would probably be the first, but 
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your hypo sort of  addressed that by saying that maybe we don’t know who’s launching the attack, 
but we know it’s coming from that server. 
Analytically, we’d have to resolve whether the server located in country Hypothetica, is the attack be-
ing directed by the country of  Hypothetica? Are they even aware of  the fact? Then the next step of  
the analysis would be are they aware of  the fact that the attack is being launched from within their 
territory? I think that, absent that awareness, we would violate the principle of  neutrality to attack 
them, even though the attack is coming from their territory. We wouldn’t like this operationally be-
cause we would have to slow the process down to contact the President of  Hypothetica to ask them 
to intervene to stop this. 
That’s like neutrality law going back about 100 years; that’s what I would be required to do in that 
circumstance. Whether we would actually do it, of  course, because of  the reverse attribution is an-
other question. Or, if  you tried to characterize the counter operation as an intelligence operation for 
domestic law purposes, it might allow you to make an end run around the requirement of  notifica-
tion. This is the central challenge that we’re defining here. The attribution issue becomes one that [is 
complicated]; there could be operations where an attacker intentionally makes it appear that the neu-
tral is the party that’s attacking in the hopes of  bringing out one party to attack another and drawing 
others in to a potential conflict. I think on the straight analysis with the hypothetical you gave, the 
law as it stands would require notification to the host state government prior to attacking. I imagine 
that’s the position of  the United States on that, or at least some agencies inside the United States. 
PAUL ROSENZWEIG: It is indeed and that’s why the law is wrong. Imagine a hypothetical. This 
extreme is a little bit of  the imagination, but imagine if  the Cubans had not known that there were 
Russian missiles on their territory. It’s possible that there’s a secret Russian base and the Russians 
give enough money to Fidel that Fidel doesn’t ask what’s inside the bases. Would we actually be 
obliged to go an ask Cuba before responding to missile launches from that territory? 
Now under the laws of  armed conflict, if  you indulge my hypothetical and you believe in Fidel’s 
honesty; yes and wouldn’t. We just wouldn’t. We wouldn’t wait and we won’t in cyberspace and in the 
end, there’ll come to be a set of  customary norms that will probably, for example, limit the destruc-
tiveness with which we may respond. 
We were all at the same thing; we might freeze the server; encrypt it so it can’t do any more damage. 
Take it off  line. Those would be acceptable. But the customary international norm would be that 
you can’t go in and fry it so that it’s taken offline permanently and you have a major hardware dam-
age and you have to go back and buy a new one. 
That’s Rosenzweig’s corollary to the lack of  law because I’ve just developed it now. But that’s where 
we’ll wind up; somewhere in that range. I am 100 percent confident in predicting in the event of  
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such a real attack that had significant damage on an American electric grid of  that sort, the niceties 
of  existing international laws of  armed conflict would matter for naught. 100 percent confident. 
GREG MCNEIL: So just the thought of  some feasible precautions came to mind here that would it 
necessarily be an attack, a responsive attack, or could there be some way that you could almost cyber 
embargo that state. So the lesser response measure might be because we control like 94 percent of  
the servers are like in Herndon, Virginia. Figure out a way to shut off  communications from entirely 
in to or out of  that nation state until such time as you could try and resolve the issue with the nation 
state. There might be some interim measures that are technologically capable, but I think Paul’s right. 
DAN SCHNEIDER: Last question. 
QUESTION: [inaudible]
PAUL ROSENZWEIG: Well, there are two reasons. The first is that cyber is so comprehensive a 
domain that essentially it’s the treaty of  everything. Cyber infects every one of  the 18 critical infra-
structures. So any regulations we have will have the largest pan global effect. There are more than 2 
½ billion people on the network today, so that kind of  universal agreement that poses a huge gover-
nance issue. 
The other is really that, at least so far, we’re in a fundamental disagreement about what cyber warfare 
is. We’ve all been talking about it as if  it were an adjunct kinetic war with structure damage, what-
ever. You ask the Chinese, they don’t look at Washington as the threat; they look at Silicon Valley as 
the threat and they think that Twitter is a tool of  American warfare. 
In fact, I’ve had talks with the people in China and have told them that Twitter is not a government 
sponsored thing and they laugh at me because they don’t believe me. And Greg’s on Twitter, I’m 
on Twitter. I don’t know; who’s on Twitter? How many of  you tweet? Yeah, okay. Does the govern-
ment ever tell you what to tweet? No. Of  course not. But if  I go and tell the Chinese that they don’t 
believe me. They think Facebook is an American conspiracy to destabilize the regime. They see, and 
most of  the world outside of  the West sees, information and social media as a warfare domain. They 
see us as trying to destabilize their countries and we’re never going to agree on a treaty-limiting vat; 
at least I hope we won’t ever. 
DAN SCHNEIDER: Chuck.
CHUCK BARRY: Well, we have a fundamental disagreement, I think, with China and Russia in that 
they would love to have a treaty on arms control. They would call it an Arms Control Treaty in Cy-
berspace to try and reign in and catch up, perhaps, with the United States. 
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So what the U. S. policy has been is to work through the rendering or the extension of  existing trea-
ties. This is largely a reflection of  what Paul has just said and that is we don’t have our arms around 
this yet. There are so many unanswered questions and usually we don’t start with treaties. If  you 
look back at the Hague and Geneva Conventions and all the other customary laws that have come 
about and case laws that evolve, this is, I mean the formal modern part extends back 150 years. I 
think that the treaties will come once the international consensus comes, but you think about how 
long it took us until 1949 before we agreed on how to treat prisoners of  war. 
You know, I don’t think treaties are where you start, it’s kind of  where you get to after you’ve had 
experience and I think we all just kind of  agree that there has not been an armed conflict generated 
in cyberspace. There’s been no, not been, or probably will never be a purely cyber war. And the point 
I made about this kind of  being an extension of  electronic warfare. It’s not the same. We understand 
that, but it has a paternity there. So we can move from the known to the unknown in that way and 
feel comfortable that we’re at least staying abreast of  the issues in cyber space. 
Ken’s comment up front has a very close relationship to cyber robotic warfare. Seems to me to be 
much more fraught with potential problems because we are getting in it to the point of  significant 
robotic warfare in all domains. We talk about drones, but they’re in all domains.
DAN SCHNEIDER: I think that’s a good time to conclude with that remark because it brings us 
back to where we started.
Chuck your last remark was sobering because if  you look at when the laws of  war began and were 
extended in the 1860’s and 1870’s after the atrocities of  the Crimean War. Laws banning poison gas 
were after the use of  poison gas in World War I and of  course, World War II. Then to war years, you 
also had the laws about POWs and of  course, after World War II you had the Genocide Treaties. 
That’s a sobering thought that it’s only after massive damage and death has occurred that treaties 
begin to emerge and hopefully that’s not what is going to happen in this instance. 
One comment; Paul, what you were saying about the Chinese reaction [viewing] Twitter as part of  
the U. S. government. I wouldn’t just say that’s China. Much of  the rest of  the world, for instance 
in Egypt, when we had that short video that was produced, most Egyptians believe that the United 
States government was behind that or even if  we weren’t why couldn’t we just stop it. Most of  the 
rest of  the world doesn’t understand the public/private distinction that’s made that’s largely a west-
ern idea, and that leaves tremendous conspiracy theories also in much of  the rest of  the world that 
whatever happens, someone at the Pentagon or someone in the White House is pushing the button. 
So that’s what happens.
Final food for thought (I teach a course on terrorism), is whether cyber warfare is a tool of  the 
weak. After all, all you need is an Internet connection and some computer genius. It doesn’t take a 
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lot of  money to do a lot of  damage. Just like terrorism is a tool; people don’t owe a lot of  money, 
but they can maximize their impact. 
MALE VOICE: Does anyone have final comments? 
CHUCK BARRY: This is just two fingers, but it goes back to the point about robotic warfare. Just 
think about the fact that all the modern armies of  the world have moved in the last 30 or 40 years 
away from conscription [with] the separation of  the professional forces from the population. 
In a certain sense we’re moving towards robotic warfare in that we have a separate force that we 
could just send out there that is increasingly robotic itself. So the push button, the idea of  democra-
cies going to war, not fighting each other, stems in part from the fact that if  they decide to do that 
they’d have to actually be the ones to go do that. That is increasingly less the case across all western 
forces. 
And so the decision to send your armed forces is oftentimes a money decision; it’s our team, and we 
support our forces, but we don’t know them. We’re increasingly not knowing them and we’ll know 
them even less when they’re more and more robotic. And then we will get to the point where it’s 
sending our respective robots to do this work.
DAN SCHNEIDER: Well I would like to thank the International Law Review and the National 
Security Law Brief  for organizing, at least, this session. The afternoon session promises to be as 
interesting and stimulating as this session. 
I particularly want to thank our three incredible speakers who you’ve been privileged to hear from 
some of  the true experts in the world on these issues. 
